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Abstract 
Phosphates processing in chemical complex sites are confronted with the need to control the various risks associated with accidents at 
workplace, but also those which are considered as major risks for the environment and off-site populations generated by hazardous 
materials used in the process. 
The objective of this intervention is to present the active approach adopted by OCP to map the various risks in chemicals activities at the 
site of SAFI. 
A Safety study was conducted, focused on the different divisions and services activities and based on the methodology of the Safety case 
used for SEVESO AS sites, according to the French regulation. 
Improvement actions in technical, organizational and human areas are identified in order to control risks to an acceptable level. 
Following this Safety study, the emergency plan (or Internal Operation Plan) has been updated, allowing OCP to manage operations in 
order to control potential accidents. 
© 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Selection and /or 
peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of SYMPHOS 2011. 
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1. Introduction 
Risk Management of industrial systems is based on a set of risk analyses carried out by sector: technical, human, 
organizational, environmental. However to achieve risk management, we have to take into account interactions between 
these different types of risk: the technical risks associated with components of these systems, the individuals who operate 
these systems, the environmental context, the physical hazards and the applied regulations.  
Aware that the risks may have consequences on people, property and environment, internally but also externally of its 
chemical complex and mining sites, OCP Group is committed to a voluntary approach of Risk Management, in order to 
position itself as a leader in safety. 
Maximal securing of industrial sites and a complete and thorough identification of risks they generate on off-site 
population are a key objective. 
According to this objective, a safety study was conducted on the site of the chemical complex of SAFI, focused on the 
different divisions and services activities. Consequently, the emergency plan (Internal Operations Plan) has been updated. 
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2. Content of the Safety study 
The Safety study of the SAFI chemical complex was conducted using the methodology of the Safety case used for 
SEVESO AS sites, according to the French regulation. 
This approach is based on a deterministic approach supported by a probabilistic assessment (since the "AZF" accident in 
Toulouse in September 2001). 
It includes the following main steps: 
• Risks identification and characterization; 
• Feedback regarding past accidents (internal OCP accidents and external accidents); 
• Risk analysis; 
• Mapping of major accidents effects areas; 
• Proposition of improvement actions plan.  
3. Significant results of Risk analyses 
3.1 Risk Analyses dedicated to installations  
The principle of risk analysis selected to study the chemical complex facilities (facilities using hazardous materials) is a 
well known approach which addresses two steps: 
• A Preliminary Risk Analysis which aims to prioritize equipments according to their criticality. Selected critical 
equipments (by a scoring system) were then subjected to a Detailed Risk Analysis; 
• A Detailed Risk Analysis which consists of a detailed study of various accident scenarios (deviations) that could 
happen to each selected equipment followed with identification of the dedicated prevention and protection measures. 
Risk analyses were conducted in a working group with OCP staff, which was proactive in improvement actions 
proposals. 
As part of the Detailed Risk Analysis, a risk ranking was performed, based on assessments of the occurrence probability 
and of the severity of risk consequences. 
3.2 Identification of hazardous phenomena to be characterized with a detailed assessment of their consequences  
Detailed Risk Analysis has identified the hazardous phenomena which have to be characterized in terms of effect 
intensity, seriousness of consequences of accidents, probability and development kinetics 
Among these hazardous phenomena to be characterized, we can mention: 
• The fire of solid sulfur storage on port area; 
• The rupture of the sulfuric acid line in the sulfuric acid manufacturing units; 
• The dispersion of sulfur oxides to the chimney following failure of absorption process in the sulfuric acid 
manufacturing units; 
• - The dispersion of sulfuric acid plume to the chimney in the sulfuric acid manufacturing units. 
To estimate the effect intensity, the distances are calculated based on calculation methods or by using proven software: 
• - 2D modeling using the PHAST software from DNV Software for the toxic atmospheric dispersion, 
• - 3D modeling software using the NIST FDS software for the special case of toxic fumes dispersion generated during 
the fire of solid sulfur storage on SAFI port. This tool has been selected to take into consideration the relief associated 
with the presence of a cliff. 
Effect threshold limit values chosen for these effects distances (thermal, overpressure and toxic effects thresholds) come 
from the French regulation. 
3.3 Risk acceptability matrix 
According to the intensity effect distances, are identified the hazardous phenomena with effects outside of the site 
borders (which generate effects on off-site populations). 
These major hazardous phenomena were then positioned according to their probability of occurrence and to their severity 
on populations into a risk acceptability matrix or criticality grid (see Table 1), based on the risk acceptability matrix of the 
French regulation related to SEVESO AS sites. 
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Table 1: Risk acceptability matrix (for major hazardous phenomena) 
Probability 
Severity 
E D C B A 
Possible but extremely 
improbable Very Improbable Improbable Probable Frequent 
5 
          
Disastrous 
4 
          
Catastrophic 
3 
          
Important 
2 
          
Serious 
1 
          
Moderate 
Color legend: 
 Acceptable risk area 
 Tolerable if ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) 
 Actions to implement 
 Unacceptable risk area 
.4 Improvement Actions 
From the risk assessment, improvement actions have been identified in technical, organizational and human areas to 
ontrol risks to an acceptable level, including: 
Improvement actions resulting from Detailed Risk Analysis conducted in working group; 
Improvement actions resulting from the positioning of major hazardous phenomena in the unacceptable area in the Risk 
acceptability matrix (see Table 1). 
It should be noted several actions are in the form of general recommendations that require further study to the reality of 
he field. 
.5 Safety areas around installations 
The compilation of all the effects distances plots of the major hazardous phenomena has determined the limits of a safety 
one (according to the irreversible effects threshold to human life), to be considered by authorities in order to determine the 
ORSEC plan, and the Specific Response Plan (French regulation: PPI). 
These same plots also allow OCP to appreciate the needs in land-use planning around the SAFI chemical complex site 
minimum distances to be respected for the implementation of new factories or extra-OCP infrastructures and new public 
uildings ...).
4. Linked with the Safety study: the emergency plan (POI)  
Based on the Safety report, the emergency plan (Internal Operation Plan) of the SAFI chemical complex site has been 
updated. 
The Internal Operation Plan (POI) is a decision support tool usable in internally by the operator on site and externally by 
mergency services, upon occurrence of major accidents identified in the Safety report. Its contents meet good French 
practices. 
It focused on the control of significant and representative potential accidents within the boundaries of the site. 
Actions have to be implemented to transform this "documentary" Internal Operation Plan in an "operational tool", such 
s: 
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• Staff training on emergency situations management: 
• Conducting exercises (or drills) to test the in-house emergency deployment; coordination means and emergency 
response unit operation; 
• Coordination with external emergency services and authorities. 
5. Conclusion 
The Safety study carried out on the SAFI chemical complex site was based on the methodology of the Safety case used 
for SEVESO AS sites, according to the French regulation. 
It led to identify improvement actions in technical, organizational and human areas in order to control risks to an 
acceptable level. 
Following this Safety study, the emergency plan (or Internal Operation Plan) has been updated, allowing OCP to manage 
operations in order to control potential accidents, and improvement actions were also identified to ensure its operational 
nature. 
All this approach is part of a process of on-going improvement of safety control set by the OCP Group.
